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Abstract 
The Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI) is one of the most widely studied and used methods 
to interview witnesses. However, ECI research has mainly focused on increasing report size 
and somewhat overlooked how to improve and evaluate report accuracy. No study evaluated 
if witnesses’ spontaneous expressions of uncertainty are accurate metacognitive judgments, 
nor if witnesses’ motivation during the interview affects report accuracy. This study examined 
how witnesses’ judgments of recall ‘uncertainty’ and their motivation perception could relate 
to report accuracy. 44 psychology students watched a mock robbery video recording and were 
interviewed 48 hours later with either the Portuguese version of the ECI or a Structured 
Interview (SI). Afterward, participants’ motivation was assessed and items of information 
were classified as ‘certainties’ or ‘uncertainties’. Results suggest that our ECI protocol was 
effective, since participants interviewed with the ECI produced more information without 
compromising accuracy. ‘Uncertainties’ were less accurate than ‘certainties’, and their 
exclusion raised overall, ECI, and SI, accuracy. More motivated participants had better recall 
accuracy. Accounting for witnesses’ motivation and spontaneous verbal expressions of 
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uncertainty may be effective and time-saving procedures to increase accuracy. These are key 
points that professionals and researchers should consider. 
 
Keywords: Enhanced Cognitive Interview; Motivation; Certainty; Metacognition; 
Metamemory 
 
 
Introduction 
As several researchers (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Prescott, Milne, & Clark, 2011) 
have acknowledged over the years, interviewing witnesses is a key procedure that frequently 
determines the outcome of a police investigation. However, memory is not so accurate and 
what witnesses actually report rarely corresponds fully with what they remember (Bower, 
1967), particularly when inadequate interviewing techniques are used (Flin, Boon, Knox, & 
Bull, 1992).  
 To address this issue, Geiselman et al. (1984) developed the Cognitive Interview (CI). 
The Cognitive Interview originally included four cognitive mnemonics: report everything, 
mental reinstatement of context, change order, and change perspective.  The report everything 
mnemonic consists of instructing witnesses to report everything they can remember, whether 
it seems trivial or not (Fisher & Geiselman, 2010). The mental reinstatement of context 
consists of asking witnesses to mentally recreate the to-be-recalled event, as well as their 
physiological, cognitive and emotional states at the time of the crime. Lastly, the change order 
(asking the witness to recall the event in a different chronological order – e.g., reverse order) 
and change perspective mnemonics (to recall the event from a different perspective - e.g., 
report what the witness saw from another witness’ point of view) can be used to try to obtain 
information that has not yet been recalled. A few years later, this was further developed by 
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Fisher and Geiselman (1992) as the Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI). Several social and 
communicative components, such as rapport building, witness-compatible questioning, 
transferring control of the interview to the witness and mental imagery, crucial for conducting 
good investigative interviews, were added (see Geiselman and Fisher, 2014, or Paulo, 
Albuquerque, and Bull, 2013, for more information about the ECI mnemonics and 
components, as well as the theory underlying such procedures [Tulving, 1991; Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973]). 
As Paulo et al. (2013) also reviewed, the ECI has been found to be effective in 
different countries (e.g., USA, UK, Australia, Brazil), with different types of witness (e.g., 
children, adults, elderly), with various delays between the crime and the interview (e.g., 
minutes to weeks), with a variety of events (e.g., crime, traffic accident, phone call), both in 
laboratory and field studies. These studies consistently showed that this interview technique 
increases the amount of correct information recalled by witnesses, while maintaining 
accuracy, i.e., the amount of correct items of information proportionate to all recalled items of 
information. Such a finding is commonly referred to as the ECI superiority effect (Akehurst, 
Milne, & Köhnken, 2003; Aschermann, Mantwill, & Köhnken, 1991; Campos & Alonso-
Quecuty, 1999; Higham & Memon, 1999; Köhnken, Milne, Memon, & Bull, 1999; Dando & 
Milne, 2010; Memon, Wark, Bull, & Koehnken, 1997; Rivard, Fisher, Robertson, & Mueller, 
2014). As mentioned above, most of the ECI research is focused on how to increase the 
amount of produced information without decreasing report accuracy. Nonetheless, actually 
increasing or evaluating report accuracy, i.e., the proportion of correct details in a given 
statement, is also crucial for police investigations (Milne & Bull, 1999). It could be very 
valuable if it could be determined which of the recalled information is more likely to be 
correct and which may be incorrect. One of the most promising methods to achieve this goal 
could be to use metacognitive techniques for monitoring recall (Evans & Fisher, 2010).  
COGNITIVE INTERVIEW: MONITORING AND MOTIVATION                              4 
 
Metacognition refers to what we know about our own cognition and how we can use 
such knowledge to regulate cognition, as well as what we know about our own memory and 
mnemonic strategies (metamemory), and how we can use such knowledge to improve our 
memory, particularly, in terms of quality (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1996). In fact, research on 
metacognition contributed to researchers changing their focus from improving report quantity 
to improving report quality (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996).  Subsequently, several studies 
addressed how metacognitive techniques can be used to improve or evaluate witnesses’ 
accuracy (Higham, Luna, & Bloomfield, 2010; Roberts & Higham, 2002). For the purpose of 
the present study, we will focus on three of those techniques: confidence judgments; 
frequency judgments; and report option.  
Several studies suggest that in some situations, such as selections from lineups 
(Brewer, Weber, Wootton, & Lindsay, 2012; Lindsay et al., 2013), cued recall (Luna & 
Martín-Luengo, 2012), or free recall (Allwood, Ask, & Granhag, 2007), and when using the 
adequate measures - calibration approach (Luna & Martín-Luengo, 2012), a positive relation 
between confidence and accuracy can be found. Therefore, higher accuracy for a given 
response can be expected when witnesses are more confident that such response is accurate. 
However, only two studies have focused on how this procedure can be used to evaluate ECI 
report accuracy (Allwood, Ask, & Granhag, 2007; Roberts & Higham, 2002). These authors 
interviewed witnesses with either the ECI, or a Structured Interview (SI), which is very 
similar to the ECI, but does not include some of its cognitive and social components (see 
method section). Afterwards, they asked participants to provide confidence judgments for a 
small portion of their statements, using a numerical rating scale. Using this procedure, 
witnesses were able to distinguish between more and less accurate information, regardless of 
the interview condition. Therefore the statements portions assigned with high confidence were 
more accurate than the full set of statements. However, these studies focus on metacognitive 
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procedures that are applied after the interview is conducted. After finishing the interview, a 
small portion of the witness’ report, which is selected by the interviewer, is rated in terms of 
confidence judgments. From this two main concerns can be identified. First, numerical 
confidence judgments, performed after the interview has been conducted do not reflect 
witnesses’ capacity to spontaneously differentiate statements that are less likely to be correct 
in a natural fashion (O’Hagan et al., 2006). Second, such procedures require a considerable 
amount of the interviewer’s time, for instance, for applying these scales and selecting the 
limited information which will be evaluated by the interviewee. Therefore, it is difficult to use 
such procedure, in a holistic manner, at a real police interview setting. 
Asking witnesses to predict how many items of information are correct, or wrong, for 
a given part of their statement (frequency judgments) could be a less time demanding 
approach to evaluate report accuracy (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Liberman, 
2004; Sniezek & Buckley, 1991). However, several studies questioned the accuracy of 
frequency judgments in interview settings. For instance, Granhag, Jonsson, and Allwood 
(2004) interviewed participants with either the ECI, or a SI, and subsequently asked them to 
answer to 45 forced-choice questions and give a confidence judgment for each question. 
Participants were then asked to provide a frequency judgment (how many questions they had 
answered correctly) and the authors found that participants severely underestimated their 
actual performance. Paulo, Albuquerque, Saraiva, and Bull (2015) evaluated if witnesses were 
able to perform accurate frequency judgments for each interview phase as well as for overall 
recall, during an investigative interview.  These authors presented the same (mock) crime 
recording to two groups of participants and interviewed them with either an ECI or a SI. After 
each interview phase (e.g., free recall, questioning phase, second retrieval, etc.) they asked 
participants to estimate their error rate for that particular phase (frequency judgment). The 
same question was asked at the end of the interview for overall recall. Regardless of the 
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interview phase, both groups were unable to successfully evaluate their error rate, there being 
no association between participants’ frequency judgments and participants ‘real’ error rate.  
Other studies (Evans & Fisher, 2010; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) suggest that 
witnesses can improve their accuracy by using other metacognitive control techniques, 
namely exercising ‘report option’ or adjusting ‘report precision’. Exercising ‘report option’ 
refers to giving witnesses an opportunity to withhold information. For instance, if the witness 
is not sure about her ability to accurately answer a question, or to recall part of the event, she 
can withhold such information – e.g., say “I do not remember”. Using this procedure, 
witnesses seem to be capable of withholding more unreliable information, and maintaining 
the reliable recall, consequently improving report accuracy. Accordingly, most interview 
protocols, including the ECI and SI, instruct witnesses not to guess when they do not know 
the answer to a question or do not recall part of the event. However, there are more levels of 
confidence between a ‘full guess’ (e.g., I assume he had a black shirt because robbers always 
wear black shirts) and a ‘full certainty’ (e.g., I’m sure the robber had a black shirt).  For 
instance, witnesses commonly use spontaneous verbal expressions of uncertainty (e.g., I 
think; maybe; I believe, etc.) to report somewhat uncertain information. ECI research (Dando 
& Milne, 2010; Prescott, Milne, & Clark, 2011) usually disregards such expressions in the 
coding and analysis. Thus, ‘I think the robber had a gun’ would (for example) simply be 
coded as ‘the robber had a gun’. Instead of disregarding such prepositions, the interviewer 
could ask witnesses to withhold all ‘uncertainties’ (e.g., I think the robber had a black shirt) in 
order to increase report accuracy. However, such an instruction may have several problems: 
(1) it is somewhat incompatible with the “Report Everything” mnemonic. In the same way 
that “irrelevant” recall might activate “relevant” recall (Tulving, 1991), an ‘uncertainty’ might 
activate a ‘certainty’. Therefore, asking witnesses to withhold such information might 
undermine report length; (2) even though the participant is not sure about that particular 
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information (‘uncertainty’) the interviewer might have other methods to verify the accuracy of 
such information (e.g., other witnesses’ reports, crime scene analysis, etc.). This could lead to 
the omission of very valuable information; and (3) research has not yet evaluated if items of 
information that are spontaneously preceded, or followed (e.g., the robber had a black shirt, I 
think.), by wording that expresses uncertainty (‘uncertainties’) differ, in terms of accuracy, 
from items of information not preceded/ followed by such wording (‘certainties’).  
To evaluate if spontaneous verbal expressions of uncertainty can be used to evaluate 
and improve report accuracy, we decided to treat these two separately, and test: (a) if 
‘certainties’ would involve greater accuracy than ‘uncertainties’; and (b) if the ECI superiority 
effect over a SI (in terms of quantity of information) does not affect other parameters, such as 
the proportion of ‘uncertainties’ or the accuracy of such information. To date, no study has 
evaluated if witnesses are able to perform spontaneous real-time memory monitoring for their 
account. This is crucial because, if witnesses are able to spontaneously discriminate less 
reliable information while reporting the crime, differentiating ‘uncertainties’ from 
‘certainties’ can be an easy, intuitive, and time-saving way (O’Hagan et al., 2006) to 
differentiate less reliable information (‘uncertainties’) from more reliable information 
(‘certainties’).  
Another method to improve, and estimate, report accuracy might involve witnesses’ 
perception of their own motivation during the interview. Two studies (Read, Powell, Kebbell, 
& Milne, 2009; Walsh & Bull, 2011) recently acknowledged that witnesses’ perceptions 
towards the interview process might determine how rapport is established and maintained 
throughout the interview, which might be crucial during investigative interviews and 
associated with better recall (Vallano & Compo, 2015). Fisher and Geiselman (2010) also 
suggested that interviewing witnesses involves more than mere use of cognitive techniques. 
They recognize the need for more studies addressing witnesses’ attitudes towards the 
COGNITIVE INTERVIEW: MONITORING AND MOTIVATION                              8 
 
interview process and the interviewer, which is a topic that has yet received very little 
attention from researchers. Recent findings (Ballardin, Stein, & Milne, 2013) suggest that 
witness’ perceptions, such as the perception of interviewer effort and the perception of their 
own motivation during the interview can have a major influence on the outcome of the 
investigative interview. However, it is important to understand how these perceptions can 
influence witnesses’ report, for instance, in terms of report accuracy (Fisher & Geiselman, 
2010). To our knowledge, such research questions have not yet been addressed. Therefore, the 
present study examined how witnesses’ perceptions can influence their report. We focused on 
whether witnesses’ perception of their own motivation was related to their recall in terms of 
report accuracy because, as previously mentioned, improving report accuracy is the main 
focus of our study. If more motivated witnesses achieve better report accuracy, promoting 
witnesses’ motivation can be another possible method to further increase report quality.  
 Overall, our main goal was to see if report accuracy can be increased, and/or 
estimated, through two different procedures: (1) witnesses spontaneous metacognitive 
judgments and (2) witnesses’ perception of their own motivation. We established three main 
hypotheses: (1) uncertainties’ will be less accurate than ‘certainties’, because participants will 
be able to monitor the information they are providing homogeneously throughout the 
interview (Allwood, Ask, & Granhag, 2007; Evans & Fisher, 2010; Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996; Roberts & Higham, 2002). As a result,  removing ‘uncertainties’ from the report will 
increase accuracy; (2) The ECI superiority effect over a SI (in terms of quantity of 
information) does not affect other parameters, such as the proportion of ‘uncertainties’ or, as 
several studies suggest (Aschermann, Mantwill, & Köhnken, 1991; Dando & Milne, 2010; 
Rivard, Fisher, Robertson, & Mueller, 2014), report accuracy. Therefore, longer reports are 
expected for the ECI condition as the result of using effective cognitive mnemonics to 
improve recall; (3) Witnesses who rate themselves as more motivated during the interview 
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will have greater accuracy, because they are more motivated to provide a good report, and 
possibly will apply more effort to monitor their report through spontaneous metacognitive/ 
metamemory techniques. 
 
 
 
Method 
Participants  
A total of 44 Portuguese psychology students, 36 females and 8 males, with an age 
range from 17 to 46 years old (M = 21, SD = 3) participated in this study for course credits. 
We have used G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) to conduct  power 
analysis based on the effect sizes reported in a recent ECI meta-analysis review (Memon, 
Meissner, & Fraser, 2010) to ensure that our sample size was adequate. Both interview groups 
had 22 participants, 18 females and 4 males each. The ECI group age ranged from17 to 46 
years old (M = 21, SD = 6) and the SI group age ranged from 18 to 34 years old (M = 21, SD 
= 4). 
Design 
A between subjects experimental design was used with interview condition as the 
independent variable with two levels: (1) Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI), and (2) 
Structured Interview. The amount of reported information and accuracy were measured in 
information units and proportion, respectively.  
Materials 
The participants watched the recording on a Fujitsu L7ZA LCD computer screen. The 
video recording, which was edited from the second episode of the first season of the 2004 
Portuguese television drama “Inspector Max” (Riccó & Riccó, 2004), was three minutes and 
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eleven seconds long. This non-violent video recording shows a male armed subject walking 
inside a bank and taking several hostages to carry the robbery. He verbally and physically 
interacts with them, with the cashier and a police officer that later approaches the robber.    
After the interview was conducted, participants were asked to evaluate their 
motivation during the interview (“How do you evaluate your motivation to testify during the 
interview?”) on a seven point Likert scale (1- very low; 2 – low; 3 – slightly low; 4 – 
moderate; 5 - slightly high; 6 – high; and 7- very high). All interviews were video and audio 
recorded. 
Procedure 
Ethics committee approval was obtained. Participants took part in two sessions. At the 
first session they were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (ECI vs SI). Having 
signed a consent form after reading general information about the study, they were shown the 
video recording. They were asked to pay as much attention as possible to the video recording 
because they would be later interviewed about it. The second session took place 
approximately forty-eight hours later and each participant was interviewed with either the ECI 
or SI. After the interview, all participants immediately answered the question regarding 
motivation perception. 
 
Interview conditions. The interview protocols employed were translated and adapted from 
Milne and Bull (2003) for the Portuguese language. Overall, the only differences between the 
ECI and SI protocols were the four cognitive mnemonics and the transfer of control 
instruction and mental imagery (see Table 1). Both interview protocols included procedures 
such as rapport building and appropriate questioning (e.g., witness-compatible questioning) 
because they are now considered an essential aspect of any investigative interview. Thus, we 
wanted to focus on the effect that the remaining components, only applied in the ECI 
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condition, would have on recall. All SI procedures were also included in the ECI. Fisher and 
Geilseman’s (1992) guidelines for conducting the ECI were followed. All the cognitive, social 
and communicative components described in Fisher and Geiselman (1992) were included in 
the ECI protocol. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Both interview protocols enclosed seven main phases: (1) preliminary phase; (2) free 
report; (3) open-ended questioning; (4) second retrieval; (5) third retrieval (for new 
information only); (6) summary; and (7) closure.  
During phase 1 (preliminary phase) procedures such as greeting, establishing rapport, 
explaining the instructions and purpose of the interview to the witness and asking not to 
guess, were followed for both interview protocols. However, the ECI condition included the 
transfer of control instruction: (…) you are the only one who saw the video and have the 
ability to report all the important information (…) you can tell me what happened in the order 
you desire and pause whenever you want; as well as the report everything instruction:(…) 
please tell me everything that you remember with as much detail as you can (…) even the 
details that might seem irrelevant to you, are very important to me (…) tell me everything that 
pops into your mind.  
During phase 2 (free report) participants were asked to recall what they could 
remember about the video in any order and pace they desired. In the ECI condition, they were 
reminded to report everything they could remember with as much detail as possible, and 
mental reinstatement of context was applied: (…) Try to remember the day you have watched 
the video (…) now picture the crime scene in your mind (…) as clear as possible (…) picture 
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all the sounds (…) all the objects (…) all the people (..) and now focus on what happened and 
tell me everything you can remember. 
 During phase 3 (open-ended questioning) three open-ended questions were asked to 
each participant according to his/her free report (e.g., Please describe the perpetrator – if the 
participant previously reported seeing the criminal). However, for the ECI condition, mental 
imagery instructions were used – e.g., you told me that you looked at the perpetrator when he 
entered the bank, because he looked very anxious. Can you please close your eyes …, think 
about everything that you remember concerning him …, his clothes …, his face …, his 
behavior … and when you have a full picture of him in your mind, describe everything that 
you can remember about him.  
During phase 4 (second retrieval) participants were asked to report what they could 
remember about the video once again: (…) I know it may seem redundant, but it is actually 
highly important that you report one more time what happened on the video (…) report not 
only new information that you might recall, but also all the information you’ve already 
reported (…). In both conditions participants were encouraged to give this second report and 
the importance of such procedure was explained: It is very important that you focus as hard 
as you can and tell me one more time what happened on the video. In the ECI condition, 
participants were asked to recall the video in the reverse order: (…) Please tell me what 
happened in reverse order (…) Focus on the last episode that you remember … then focus on 
the previous one … and so on (…). What is the last episode that you remember? 
During phase 5 (third retrieval) participants were asked to focus one more time on the 
video and try to report any new detail they could remember, if possible. In both interview 
conditions the importance of such a procedure was explained and participants were 
encouraged to do the best they could. In the ECI condition, participants were asked to adopt a 
different internal perspective in order to try to remember new details: (…) please focus on the 
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event as if it was a common event at the bank, instead of a robbery, as you probably assumed 
before seeing the robber entering the bank (…).  
On phase 6 (summary) the interviewer summarized what he understood of the witness 
account and asked her to correct him if he misheard, or misinterpreted, any part of the 
statement. He also told her to interrupt him if she/he could remember any new detail while 
hearing the summary. On the last phase (closure), appreciation for participants’ hard work and 
cooperation was acknowledged and neutral topics were again discussed. These last two 
phases were exactly alike for both interview conditions.  
 
Interviewer training. An expert in the ECI who had followed several qualified courses on 
investigative interview techniques, consisting of more than 50 hours of lectures, practice, 
role-playing exercises and feedback/ evaluation, conducted all the interviews. To assure that 
the interviewer performance was adequate and consistent across interview conditions, 
interview protocols were read verbatim whenever possible (e.g., open-ended questioning and 
summary phase need to be adapted according to the participant’ previous recall) and an 
independent researcher, which is also an expert on human memory and forensic psychology, 
randomly checked 25% of the interviews, using a structured evaluation grid to evaluate 
verbal, and non-verbal, behavior.  
 
Coding. Recordings of each interview were coded using the template scoring technique from 
Memon et al (1997). A comprehensive list of details in the video recording was compiled and 
items of information were categorized as referring to: (1) person; (2) action; (3) object; (4) 
location; (5) conversation; and (6) sound, resulting in 378 items of information. Recalled 
information was classified as either correct, incorrect (e.g., saying the pistol was brown when 
it was black), or confabulation (mentioning a detail or event that was not present or did not 
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happen). Also noted was the phase within the interview in which an item of information was 
recalled. If an item of information (correct or not) was repeated during the same, or a 
subsequent phase, that information was scored only the first time it was mentioned (Prescott 
et al., 2011). We classified items of information as either ‘certainties’ or ‘uncertainties’. As 
described above, when participants spontaneously used verbal expressions of uncertainty 
(e.g., I think; maybe; I believe, etc.) to report an item of information they were uncertain 
about, such item was classified as an ‘uncertainty’. Otherwise, items of information were 
labeled as ‘certainties’. Coders were provided with a list of Portuguese words that are 
commonly used to express uncertainty. They have used their best judgment to verify the 
intent of the participant when using this kind of expressions of uncertainty, because, in very 
rare situations, these expressions could be used with other purposes rater than express 
uncertainty. Therefore, in these exceptional cases, the adjacent information would not be rated 
as an ‘uncertainty’. Inter-rater reliability was assessed to measure agreement on this measure, 
as discussed in the following section. Subjective statements or opinions were disregarded 
(e.g., The robber was gorgeous).  
 
Inter-rater reliability. To assess inter-rater reliability, 11 (25%) interviews were selected 
randomly and scored independently by a researcher who was naive to the aims of the 
experiment and hypothesis, but familiar with the template method of scoring interviews and 
had access to the crime video. Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) were calculated for 
correct information, incorrect information and confabulations, as well as for ‘certainties’ and 
‘uncertainties’, and for the six information categories (person, action, etc.). High inter-rater 
reliability was found for all measures in that the values of the ICC ranged between .979 and 
1.000, with an overall ICC of .992. 
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Results 
Bonferroni corrections were applied when multiple statistical tests were conducted on 
a single data set, to avoid type 1 error (Field, 2009). 
 
 
 
General recall and accuracy.  
It was expected that participants in the ECI condition would provide more correct 
items of information, in comparison with a control group (SI), without compromising 
accuracy. Participants in the ECI condition recalled more correct items of information (MECI = 
76, SD = 24.71) in comparison with the control group (MSI = 58, SD = 13.91), t (42) = 2.96, p 
= .005, d = .89, 95% CI [-30.11, -5.71].  
As seen on Table 2, no differences were found between the two interviews regarding 
the proportion values of (i) correct recall (ratio between the amount of correct items of 
information recalled over all the items of information), t (42) = .96, p = .343, d = .29; (ii) 
errors (ratio between the amount of errors produced over all items of information), t (42) = 
1.12, p = .269, d = .34; and (iii) confabulations (ratio between the amount of confabulated 
information over all items of information), t (42) = .80, p = .431, d = .24. Thus, participants 
interviewed with the ECI were able to provide more information without increasing the 
proportion of errors and confabulations on their reports.  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
 ‘Uncertainties’ frequency.  
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We first conducted a two-way mixed-design 2 X 5 ANOVA to see if ‘uncertainties’ 
proportion (i.e, information units which are preceded, or followed, by expressions of 
uncertainty over all information units) was stable across interview conditions (ECI vs. SI), 
and interview phases (phase 2 vs. phase 3 vs. phase 4 vs. phase 5 vs. phase 6). Phase 1 
(preliminary phase) was not included in this analysis because participants were not asked to 
recall information at this part of the interview. 
 We found no main effect of interview condition on uncertainties proportion, F (1, 12) 
= .09, p = .770,  2 = 0. Therefore, our results do not suggest that participants in the ECI 
condition produce a higher ‘uncertainties’ proportion (MECI = .14, SD = .08), in comparison to 
the SI group (MSI = .12, SD = .07). Although we found a main effect of the interview phase on 
‘uncertainties’ proportion, F (4, 48) = 3.43, p = .02,  2 = .21, pairwise comparisons revealed 
no significant differences between any of the different interview phases regarding this (Mphase2 
= .04; Mphase3  = .14; Mphase 4 = .08; Mphase 5 = .03; Mphase 6 = .02) . There is also no interaction 
effect of interview condition and interview phase on ‘uncertainties’ proportion, F (4, 48) = 
1.04, p = .394,  2 = .06. 
Further analysis revealed that report size (total amount of details) is not associated 
with the proportion of produced ‘uncertainties’ (proportion of ‘uncertainties’ in a given 
report), r = .29, p = .06. Therefore, our study does not support that participants who are 
providing more information units are more uncertain about such information. There is also no 
correlation between the proportion of produced ‘uncertainties’ in a report and proportion of 
correct recall for the remaining recall (proportion of correct information for ‘certainties’ 
only), r = .25, p = .10. Thus, our data does not support that participants who are providing 
more uncertainties are simultaneously committing more errors/ confabulations when recalling 
‘certainties’. 
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‘Uncertainties’ accuracy.  
The ‘uncertainties’ constituted a small proportion of the overall recall (M = .13, SD = 
.08). Furthermore, their exclusion from the accuracy analysis raised this proportion value 
from .86 (overall correct recall: amount of correct items of information over the total amount 
of produced items of information) to .90 (correct recall for ‘certainties’ only : amount of 
correct ‘certainties’ over all produced ‘certainties’). Such difference was statistically 
significant, t (43) = 7.38, p < .001, d = 1.11, 95% CI [-.04, -.02]. Error proportion for 
‘certainties’ only was significantly lower than overall error proportion (amount of errors over 
the total amount of produced items of information), t (43) = 6.65, p < .001, d = 1.02, 95% CI 
[-.22, -.11] and confabulation proportion for ‘certainties’ only was also lower than overall 
confabulation proportion, t (43) = 3.22, p = .002, d = .93, 95% CI [.03, .11]. Such results 
occur because, as showed on Table 3, correct recall proportion for ‘uncertainties’ is low and 
significantly different from correct recall proportion for ‘certainties’ only, t (43) = 7.99, p < 
.001, d = 1.21, 95% CI [.18, .30] in that .65 of  ‘uncertainties” were correct items of 
information, in comparison with ‘certainties’ that have a .90 correct recall rate.  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Similar results were found for the ECI and SI conditions alone. The exclusion of 
‘uncertainties’ within the ECI accuracy analysis raised this from .86 (overall proportion of 
correct recall) to .89 (proportion of correct recall for certainties only), t (21) = 7.01, p < .001, 
d = 1.49, 95% CI [-.04, -.02]. The exclusion of ‘uncertainties’ within the SI accuracy analyses 
also raised this from .87 (overall correct recall proportion) to .90 (correct recall proportion 
value for certainties only), t (21) = 4.30, p < .001, d = .92, 95% CI [-.05, -.02]. 
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Witnesses’ motivation perception. 
  Out of a seven point Likert scale (1- very low; 2 – low; 3 – slightly low; 4 – moderate; 
5 - slightly high; 6 – high; and 7- very high), only the highest four levels of motivation were 
chosen by participants to rate their motivation, Nmoderate = 4 (NECI = 2; NSI = 2); Nslightly high = 13 
(NECI = 10; NSI = 3); Nhigh = 21 (NECI = 15; NSI = 6); Nvery high = 6 (NECI = 4; NSI = 2). Procedures such 
as rapport building and greeting, which were part of both interview conditions, might have 
precluded lower levels of motivation.  
 We found no effect of interview condition (ECI or SI) on participant’ perception of 
their own motivation during the interview, U = 196, p = .245, r = .18. However, participants’ 
perception of their own motivation during the interview was correlated to report accuracy, 
measured in correct recall proportion, rs = .37, p = .026, 95% CI [.10, .68].  
Since ‘moderate’ and ‘very high’ motivation levels were chosen by only a few 
participants (N = 10) we merged the two lowest levels of motivation (‘moderate’ and ‘slightly 
high’ motivation) and the two highest levels of motivation (‘high’ and ‘very high’ motivation) 
in order to have more participants in each group: ‘lower’ motivation (N = 17) and ‘higher 
motivation’ (N = 27). Afterwards, we’ve conducted a t-test for independent samples and 
found that witnesses who perceived themselves as more motivated during the interview had a 
higher correct recall proportion (Mhigh Mot = .88, SD = .05) than witnesses who reported having 
lower levels of motivation (Mlow Mot = .84, SD = .07), t (42) = 2.35, p = .023,  d = .73, 95% CI 
[-.08, -.01]. 
Discussion 
This study examined how use of witnesses’ spontaneous metacognitive judgments of 
‘uncertainty’, as well as their perception of their own motivation, could help to increase 
and/or evaluate report accuracy. Our major findings were that spontaneous ‘uncertainties’ 
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were less accurate than ‘certainties’ and thus their exclusion raised overall, ECI, and SI, 
accuracy values. Also, witnesses who perceived themselves as more motivated during the 
interview had better recall accuracy.  
Since ECI research is mostly focused on how to increase the amount of produced 
information (Milne & Bull, 1999) we focused on how to increase report accuracy. We found 
that participants were capable of spontaneously distinguish more reliable information 
(‘certainties’) from less reliable information (‘uncertainties’). Our results are supported by 
previous findings suggesting that witnesses are able to use several metacognitive techniques 
to monitor their own report (Allwood et al., 2007; Evans & Fisher, 2010; Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996; Roberts & Higham, 2002; Sniezek & Buckley, 1991). However, to our knowledge, this 
is the first study to reveal that witnesses are able to spontaneously perform real-time memory 
monitoring while recalling information in an interview setting. Furthermore, such results were 
stable across both interview conditions (ECI or SI) which is consistent with previous findings 
suggesting that metacognitive techniques are effective in several different situations and 
contexts (Allwood et al., 2007; Lindsay et al., 2013;Luna & Martín-Luengo, 2012). Such 
findings can have major implications for real-life investigations. 
 Our study is also consistent with previous research (Aschermann, Mantwill, & 
Köhnken, 1991; Dando & Milne, 2010; Rivard, Fisher, Robertson, & Mueller, 2014) that 
suggest the ECI superiority effect over a SI (in terms of quantity of information) does not 
affect other parameters, such as the accuracy of such information and, as our study now 
suggests, the proportion of produced uncertainties. When confronted with consecutive 
retrieval attempts or instructions such as the “report everything” mnemonic, participants could 
provide ‘uncertain’ information that they might otherwise withhold, therefore explaining the 
increase in recall on the ECI condition. Our study does not support this, because even though 
the ECI participants are providing more details, they are not eliciting a higher proportion of 
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‘uncertainties’.  Such results are highly important for ECI usage, because they suggest that 
more detailed reports, typically achieved when using the ECI, may well be the result of 
indeed using diversified and effective recall strategies (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Paulo et 
al., 2013).Witnesses could also be withholding ‘uncertain’ information’ at the beginning of 
the interview, and later choose to reveal it, assuming that, if the interviewer is asking for 
successive retrieval attempts, he/she expects more information from the witness, regardless of 
its accuracy.  However, our study does not suggest this because pairwise comparisons 
revealed no differences between interview phases regarding the amount of produced 
uncertainties, proportion wise.  Lastly, it is important to state that we found no correlation 
between the proportion of produced ‘uncertainties’ for a given report and accuracy for the 
remaining recall. Therefore, our study does not support that ‘uncertainties’ are the result of 
inferior memory traces since witnesses who provide more ‘uncertainties’ do not seem to be 
providing more errors and confabulations in their remaining recall. We believe ‘uncertainties’ 
are the result of metacognitive monitoring that is homogeneously performed throughout the 
interview, regardless of interview condition, interview phase, or report length. Such 
monitoring is effectively performed, since only 65% of the produced ‘uncertainties” were 
correct items of information, in comparison with ‘certainties’ that have a 90% correct recall 
rate.  
Our study purposely constrained motivation perception variability with procedures 
such as greeting and establishing rapport (Vallano & Compo, 2015; Walsh & Bull, 2011) that 
aim, among many other purposes, to preclude low levels of motivation (Read et al., 2009). 
Even though we focused on the effect that motivation perception could have on report 
accuracy when only moderate to high levels of motivation were reported, we found that more 
motivated witnesses were more accurate. Such results are supported by previous research 
which suggests that witness’ perceptions towards the interviewer and the interview process 
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might have an important role on witnesses’ report (Ballardin et al., 2013; Walsh & Bull, 
2011). However, to our knowledge, this is the first study that assessed the relation between 
witnesses’ perception of their own motivation and report accuracy, suggesting that promoting 
witnesses’ motivation, for instance, through rapport, might also be another effective 
procedure to further increasing report accuracy.  
One could argue that accuracy is influencing witnesses’ motivation: participants who 
provide a more accurate report consequently feel more motivated. However, as previously 
discussed, Paulo et al. (2015) found that witnesses were unable to successfully evaluate their 
accuracy for different interview phases, as well as for the whole interview. Similarly to 
Granhag et al. (2004), these authors found no association between participants’ frequency 
judgments and participants ‘real’ error rate. Therefore, if witnesses are unable to accurately 
evaluate accuracy for large portions of their statement, and for their overall statement, it is 
very unlikely that our participants who achieved higher accuracy rates were able to perceive 
so, and consequently felt more motivated. It is our believe that highly motivated witnesses 
may be applying more effort to successfully provide an accurate report, for instance, by 
effectively monitoring such information, which, as we previously established, has a major 
role on increasing report accuracy. However, this requires further testing as discussed in the 
following section. 
Limitations and Future Directions  
Given the size of our sample, two motivation levels had only a few participants (see 
results section). This constrained our ability to further test if highly motivated participants are 
applying more effort to monitor their report, consequently providing a more accurate report. 
In the future, it would be interesting to develop a study with more participants to test if highly 
motivated witnesses present more signs of memory monitoring (e.g., elicit more 
‘uncertainties’) than witnesses who report moderate/ lower levels of motivation. Furthermore, 
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only one measure of motivation was used in this study. Given that witnesses’ motivation 
could have an effect on report accuracy; it is important to further test this hypothesis with 
other motivation measures, such as real time motivation assessments during the interview, as 
well as by manipulating participants’ motivation levels. Lastly, it would be very interesting to 
separate ‘certainties’ in two new groups: (a) ‘regular recall’ – e.g., ‘he had a black shirt’; and 
(b) ‘full certainty’ – e.g., ‘I am definitely sure he had a black shirt’. However, participants 
seldom spontaneously report a ‘full certainty’. Therefore a different research design which 
encourages participants to tell when they are absolutely sure about a piece of information they 
have previously reported is necessary.  
Conclusion 
Our findings support that differentiating spontaneous ‘certainties’ from ‘uncertainties’ 
and promoting witnesses’ motivation are key points that researchers and professionals should 
consider. Taking note of witnesses’ motivation and ability to use spontaneous verbal 
expressions of uncertainty to naturally monitor their own report might be an effective and 
time-saving procedure to increase or evaluate report accuracy.   
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Table 1  
Differences between the two interview protocols: procedures that were only applied in the ECI 
condition according to the interview phase. 
 Phase 1 
Preliminary  
Phase 2 
Free Report 
Phase 3 
Open-ended 
questioning 
Phase 4 
Second 
Retrieval  
Phase 5 
Third 
Retrieval 
Phase 6 
Summary  
ECI Transfer of control 
Report everything 
Context reinstatement 
Report everything 
Mental 
imagery 
Change 
order 
Change 
perspective 
       x 
X – No procedure specific to the ECI  
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Table 2. Proportion values (Mean and Standard Deviation) for correct recall, errors and 
confabulations, according to the interview condition.  
 
 Correct recall Errors Confabulations 
ECI .86 (.07) .09 (.04) .05 (.04) 
SI .87 (.05) .08 (.05) .05 (.03) 
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Table 3. Proportion values (Mean and Standard Deviation) for correct recall, errors and 
confabulations for ‘certainties’, ‘uncertainties’ and both types of information together 
(overall)  
 Correct recall Errors Confabulations 
‘Certanties’ .90 (.06) .06 (.04) .04 (.04) 
‘Uncertanties’ .65 (.21) .23 (.19) .12 (.15) 
Overall .86 (.06) .09 (.04) .05 (.04) 
 
 
